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1. Introduction
Innovation is nowadays widely recognized as a central driver of eco-
nomic growth and development for companies and countries. In 
consequence, many companies and many governments are putting 
innovation at the center of their strategies leading and motivating re-
search to understand better what is innovation and what determines 
and fosters it. For this purpose, in the last decades, innovation has 
been defined and analyzed at the firm as well as the systemic level, 
though most of the studies take place in developed countries and on 
the manufacturing and the high technology industries (Geldes et al 
.2017b ). Moreover, previous studies have used different definitions, 
classifications, and types of innovation, leading to some confusion in 
the field. In this context, OECD reached consensus when proposing 
an innovation’s classification in the Oslo Manual. Specifically, this 
manual considers the following definition: “innovation is the imple-
mentation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
of a process, marketing method, or a new organizational method in bu-
siness practices, workplace organization or external relations” (OECD, 
2006, p. 56). This definition introduced four different types of inno-
vation: product innovation, process innovation, marketing innova-
tion, and organizational innovation. Where product innovation and 
process innovation are closely related to the concept of technological 
developments, marketing innovations are strongly related to pricing 
strategies, product package design, product placement, and promo-
tion activities, and, finally, organizational innovations are strongly re-
lated to the business practices. After the acceptance of this definition, 
the Global Innovation Index (GII) was created in 2007 to provide a 
framework to measure innovation. In particular, this index is evol-
ving in each edition, aiming to capture the multi-dimensional facets 
of innovation by providing a rich database of detailed metrics for 126 
economies. However, even though this index contemplates so many 
metrics that influence innovation, there are still variables that are not 
considered and have not received the merited attention. From our 
point of view, this is the case of the unions. Specifically, the omission 
of this variable in the GII and its scarce attention by the academic 
community1, may undermine the private and public initiatives that 
draw on these analyses to promote innovation, especially in compa-
nies or countries with high union density or union participation.
There is evidence that shows unions can have a significant impact on 
innovation; however, if its impact is positive or negative is still a mat-
ter of discussion. On the one hand, some studies argue that unions 
may affect the ability of companies to innovate, basically because 
they reduce the control over the workplace, and increase the cost of 
labor limiting so the resources available to innovate. On the other 
hand, studies state that unions can have a positive effect because 
they force or persuade companies to compete based on innovation 
instead of competing based on low cost. 
This article examines how and to what extent unions affect compa-
nies’ innovation in Chile and contributes to the existing literature 
in the following two aspects: First, because it widens the scope 
of analysis focusing in a developing country that is characterized 
by some specificities regarding the innovation as well the union 
landscape.  Regarding innovation, as Geldes & Felzensztein, (2013) 
and Geldes et al. (2017b) show,  Chile shares common problems rela-
ted to innovation with other Latin American and emerging coun-
tries as the late adaptation of innovation, the effects of exogenous 
technological change, informality on the process of innovation, an 
adaptive and incremental nature of innovation, the lack of coordi-
nation with the national innovation  and middle and lower levels 
of social capital that implies some difficulties to the formation of 
innovation networks. Regarding unions, Chile is characterized be-
cause 1) Union density is higher than in the US  (where most of the 
studies have taken place)2, 2) Chile presents a slight growth in this 
indicator since 2000 (while in Europe and the US this indicator has 
decreased over the last decade)3. This increase has been interpreted as 
1 For instance, in Web of Science, only 3 of the 2434 papers that are focused on “product innovation”, also refer to “unions”
2 According to the ILOSTAT, in 2016, the union density attained 10.3% in the US, while 19.6% in Chile. The database is available at https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/. Consulted 25 March 2019
3 In 2000, Chile registered a union density of 14,8%  while in 2016 this number attaint the 19,6% (Dirección del Trabajo, 2016b) 
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a sign of the generational turnover and the reactivation of social pro-
test in the country (Observatorio de Huelgas Laborales, 2018), and 3) 
unions still play a political role in Chile. Historically, Latin-American 
unions have been tightly related to left-wing political parties and have 
actively engaged in the political arena, which has not been the case 
in the United States (Murillo, 2001). Although Chilean unions’ ties 
with political parties have debilitated in the last two decades as part 
of the neoliberal turn (Zapata, 2001), unions still addressee a lot of 
their time to influencing political decisions. In this sense, unions can 
be vital to developing innovation policies. Second, our study takes 
into account the impact of unions on the different types of innovation 
defined by the Oslo Manual in 2007. Most of the studies regarding the 
impact of unions on innovation have considered R&D expenditures 
as a measure of firm innovation activity. However, as not all R&D in-
vestment leads to innovation, it also has been acknowledged that this 
input measure cannot correctly represent innovation output. To avoid 
this and adhere to the definition of innovation, this paper will analyze 
the effect of unions in the different types of innovation, that is, in 
1) innovation process, 2) innovation in marketing, 3) organizational 
innovation, and 4) product innovation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review and develop competing hypotheses. Section 3 provides an 
overview of the history and legal frame of unions in Chile. Section 4 
describes the sample, variables, and methodology. Section 5 presents 
the main statistics descriptive, and the results, and Section 6 conclu-
des and discusses the results.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Empirical research has not been conclusive regarding the extent nor 
the direction of the unions’ influence on innovation.  Existing results 
have shown opposite results depending on the context and strategy 
of analysis. Expressly, U.S studies from 2010 onwards mainly agree 
that unions negatively affect innovation. For instance, Angus, Cozzi, 
and Furukawa (2016) find that an increase in the bargaining power 
of wage-oriented unionism leads to a decrease in R&D expenditures 
in the UK and the US. In the same line, Bradley, Kimb and Tianc, 
(2017), studying innovation at the firm level, find that three years 
after the union election, the patent quantity, and quality of the U.S 
companies significantly decline. However, research focused on other 
advanced economies has shown more controversial findings. In par-
ticular, Chun et al. (2015), comparing labor unionized with non-labor 
unionized Korean manufacturers, find no significant difference in 
companies’ R&D expenditures. On the contrary, some studies in Chi-
na demonstrate that unions encourage product innovation and R&D 
investment (Fang and Ying, 2012; Tong et al., 2018). In the same line, 
Walsworth (2010), using longitudinal firm-level data, shows that the 
presence of a union in Canada has a small positive effect on the firm’s 
ability to innovate new products.
Beyond the scope of developed countries, the analysis of the effect 
of unions on innovation has been minimal, particularly in Latin 
America. An exception is the work of Rios-Ávila (2017), who examines 
the relationship between unions and productivity in the manufactu-
ring sector across six Latin-American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Panamá. Four proxies of innovation are 
used as control variables: investment in R&D, foreign company te-
chnology, product quality certification, and the introduction of new 
processes or products. The study finds that there is much heterogenei-
ty across the countries of study. For instance, in Chile, a positive and 
significant effect of unionization is found on the introduction of new 
processes or products, while no effect is detected for the other three 
innovation measures. Similar results are observed for Argentina. On 
the contrary, a negative influence of unions on innovation is identi-
fied in Bolivia.
In line with previous studies that have shown conflicting results and 
heterogeneity among the countries of study, we are going to develop 
two competing hypotheses to take into account both positions. 
 
2.1. Unions have a negative effect on innovation.
In general terms, the arguments that have been used to support the 
adverse effect of the unions on innovation can be organized in two 
groups: the arguments based on the effect of union on wages, and 
those pointing the influence of unions on management. 
A fundamental part of the unions’ work is to negotiate wages with 
employers in order to improve workers’ economic wellbeing. In fact, 
in Chile, the evidence shows that most of the labor conflicts are mo-
tivated by wage negotiations (Observatorio de Huelgas Laborales, 
2018). Innovation requires considerable investment, but its effect 
on companies economic indicators takes place, most of the times, 
in the medium-long term (Rouvinen, 2002). Therefore, companies 
can be discouraged from making this investment if they think its re-
sulting benefits can be eventually expropriated by unions (Bradley, 
Kimb, and Tianc, 2017). Moreover, unions are characterized because 
they usually modify the distribution of wages and reduce inequality 
among workers (Sanhueza and Fernandez, 2015). For instance, Ver-
ma (2005:427) shows that the presence of a union reduces the likeli-
hood of variable pay plans or individual payment incentives. There-
fore, innovative workers can be motivated to migrate to non-union 
firms where individual economic rewards are more likely (Bradley, 
Kimb and Tianc, 2017). 
Unions can also discourage innovation by limiting the management 
discretion to make the necessary changes within the company to 
advance toward this specific goal (Walsworth, 2010). For instance, 
unions can prevent management from implementing human resou-
rces policies that could foster a robust corporate culture to enhance 
employee motivation and commitment to innovation (Verma, 2005: 
430). They also can put barriers to dismiss and intervene in the selec-
tion process, which can frustrate the plans of management to renew 
their staff in order to bolster innovation (Verma, 2005:423). Genera-
lly, this argument underlines that the existence of a union challenges 
the control in the workplace and thus makes more complicated the 
design, implement and assess the innovation plan. Based on the last 
arguments, our first hypothesis states:
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H1: Unions discourage firms’ product, marketing, organizational and, 
process innovations in Chile.
2.2. Unions have a positive effect on the different types of innovation.
On the opposite side, there are also arguments to sustain the posi-
tive effect of unions on innovation. The most popular argument is 
that unions have a “shock effect” on companies forcing or persuading 
management to adopt more efficient practices that they would have 
ignored otherwise, and that can improve innovation. This argument 
is based on the assumption that usually, companies do not have the 
necessary information or human ability to develop the most effective 
practices for improving innovation on their own. The fact that unions 
question management and the existent policies may encourage com-
panies to improve and be more creative in order to maintain or in-
crease firm’ profits. 
Verma (2005) distinguishes two effects within the “shock effect.” First, 
there is the “pure shock” when unions produce better efficiency in the 
areas over which management has exclusive control, by the sole fact 
of existing or without engaging directly in this improvement.  Such 
changes are initiated by management and respond to the idea that 
unions raise costs (usually increase employees’ wages and thus, the 
cost of labor) and represent a threat; therefore, there is a need to be 
more efficient. Indeed, in Chile, studies show that union members 
enjoy a wage premium close to 20 percent (Landerretche, Lillo, and 
Puentes, 2013). Therefore, companies can be encouraged to com-
pete based on innovation instead of competing based on a low-cost 
strategy (Walsworth, 2010; Fang and Ying, 2012). Second, there is a 
“voice effect,” which is directly associated with unions’ intervention. 
Unions can push management to change aspects of the production 
process that affect workers and propose creative solutions that can 
ultimately favor innovation. They also can help management in the 
design and implementation of their innovation plans, facilitating 
communication with employees, and providing feedback to ma-
nagement. There is empirical evidence that supports the idea that 
collaboration with unions is key to the success of organizational 
changes led by management (e.g., Martinez-Jurado, Moyano-Fuentes, 
Jerez-Gomez, 2014). 
Besides the “shock effect,” the positive effect of unions on innovation 
can be explained by the impact of unions’ actions over the employees’ 
behavior. Unions’ actions favor union members’ wages, and this 
can promote their commitment to innovation (Walsworth, 2010). 
Since innovation requires time to present any effect, companies 
need active engagement from employees. In that sense, unions 
provide workers the necessary guarantees to engage in higher-risk 
behaviors associated with innovation because they increase em-
ployment protection limiting dismissals and promoting seniority-
based pay at the workplace (Bradley, Kimb and Tianc, 2017; Wal-
sworth, 2010). Based on the recent arguments, our second hypothesis 
states:
H2:  Unions favor firms’ product, marketing, organizational, and pro-
cess innovations in Chile.
3. Unions in Chile: Background.
Since the direction of the union effect on innovation is probably rela-
ted to the context of analysis, this section is aimed to describe relevant 
features in the recent history of the Chilean unions and the labor legal 
framework. 
Latin American unions have been characterized as playing a subs-
tantial role in the political arena. Chilean unions are not an exception, 
although this political influence has weakened during the last four de-
cades.  Their alliance with the communist and socialist political parties 
encouraged Chilean unions to increase mobilizations throughout the XX 
century and supported the political coalition that won the presidential 
election in 1970 with the promise of leading the country to a socialist 
economy. Despite their militancy, unions exerted a steady pressure over 
authorities to advance in the promised reforms (Angell, 1972). 
The 1973 military coup deeply stroke unions.  Following a period of 
prohibition and repression against the foremost union leaders, mili-
taries authorized union activity, but under a completely different ins-
titutional framework.  A set of reforms known as the Work Plan (Plan 
Laboral) (1979) adapted labor legislation to the neoliberal prescrip-
tions that were implemented to install a market economy in Chile. 
Unions’ prerogatives were largely restricted. For instance, collective 
bargaining was limited to the firm level; unions were prohibited from 
negotiating issues that “restrain or limit the faculty of employers to 
organize, lead or manage companies”; employers were allowed to 
replace workers and close workplace during strikes; workers were 
authorized to negotiate without the intervention of a union through 
the form of a “negotiation group”.  The explicit goal of this measure 
was to promote a decentralized and depoliticized system of employ-
ment relations which could guarantee employers enough flexibility to 
adapt the new macro-economic conditions (Winn, 2004)
The recuperation of democracy in 1990 did not bring the transfor-
mations that union leaders expected. Despite the strong relationship 
between the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), the leading 
national union organization, and the political parties of the “Concer-
tación,” the center-left coalition in power from 1990 to 2009, labor 
regulation was minimally reformed. During the first decade, the CUT 
engaged with the governments in the promotion of a new national 
social pact between workers and businesses. As a result, a set of “Fra-
me Agreements” was signed with the Confederation of Production 
and Commerce. However, apart from the increased minimum wage, 
scholars agree that these pacts were mostly a demonstration of good-
will (e.g., Sehnbruch, 2013; Frank, 2004). The first two labor reforms 
(1991 and 2001) did not consent to the core demands of the CUT, 
which is the extension of the collective bargaining to the branch level, 
the elimination of strikes’ restrictions, and negotiation groups. The 
reform of 2016 eliminated the authorization of employers to replace 
workers during strikes, which were celebrated by unions as the first 
substantial change to the Labor Plan. However, other obligations, 
such as the creation of minimal services and “workers’ adjustments”, 
limited the impact of this measure (Arellano, 2015).
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The failure of its initial strategy led the CUT to increase mobilizations 
after 2000. However, its political power has been relatively weakened by 
the internal divisions (Frias, 2008; Gutiérrez, 2016) and the overall low 
union density (Dirección del Trabajo, 2016b). This had not prevented 
unions from playing an essential role in the big and medium-size com-
panies where unions are present in 65,3% and 20,5% cases, respectively 
(Dirección del Trabajo, 2016a). Moreover, unions assemble more than 
20% of the workforce in economic branches such as transportation, 
financial intermediation, community services, fishing, mining, social 
services and health (Dirección del Trabajo, 2016b). In most of these 
branches, union activity has increased over the last decade (Observato-
rio de Huelgas Laborales, 2018; Gutiérrez and Gutiérrez, 2017).
4. Sample, Variables, and Methodology
4.1. Sample.
The data that we use to test our hypotheses come from the first and 
second Longitudinal Survey of Companies in Chile4 (published in the 
year 2009 and 2012, respectively). These surveys were jointly conduc-
ted by the National Institute of Statistics, the Ministry of Economy 
and the Microdata Center of the University of Chile. The primary 
purpose of the survey is to characterize the Chilean companies, to 
identify the determinants of business development as well as to mea-
sure the impact of different variables in the Total Productivity Factor. 
This survey is addressed to formal companies that develop producti-
ve, commercial and service activity, within the territorial limits of the 
country and whose sales level is higher than 2,56 US$ during 2007 
and 23.497,63 US$ during 2009.5 The surveys were conducted by in-
terviewing face-to-face, to the owners, partners or shareholders, and 
general managers of the companies. One of the strengths of the sur-
vey is its longitudinal condition and the fact that it has been replicated 
in several years (2009, 2012, 2015 and 2017). However, the design of 
some questions has varied from year to year, which has limited our 
period of study. Despite the existence of four surveys, we have to fo-
cus on the ones published in 2009 and 2012 since the ones from 2015 
and 2017 had different questions regarding innovation and, they do 
not distinguish among the different types of innovation that we con-
sider in this paper. How we proceeded to match the companies from 
the different surveys was the following: The 2009 survey presents the 
data for 10.213 companies while the 2012 survey presents the data 
for 7.062 companies. Since companies have an anonymous identifier 
that is maintained over time, we match both surveys using it, and we 
focus on the companies for which we have data in the two periods: 
this process reduces the number of companies to 2.667. 
3.2. Variables.
3.2.1. Dependent Variables
In an attempt to have a proxy for each of the different innovation ty-
pes defined by the GII, we selected four questions from the question-
naire of the survey, and we convert this information into four dummy 
variables. Specifically, we have chosen the following questions from 
the 2012 survey:
Organizational innovation was proxied based on question F009: Have 
you carried out activities linked to the preparation and introduction of 
substantive improvements or new distribution methods? (linked to the 
logistics of the company)? With the resulting information, we created 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer was yes and equal to 0; 
otherwise. 
Product Innovation was proxied based on question F008: Has your 
company made any substantive improvement or created a new product 
in the goods/services it sells? With the resulting information, we crea-
ted a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer was yes and equal to 0; 
otherwise. 
Process innovation was proxied based on question F007: Have you 
purchased machines, equipment and/or software for the introduction of 
new or significantly improved products or processes? With the resulting 
information, we created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer 
was yes and equal to 0, otherwise. 
Marketing innovation was proxied based on question F010: Have you 
made new marketing methods that involve significant changes in 
the design or packaging of a product, its positioning, its promo-
tion or its pricing? With the resulting information, we created a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer was yes and equal to 0; 
otherwise.
We considered that the resulting information from those questions 
is comparable with the one from the year 2009, question number 68: 
In 2007, did your company introduce innovations? Answer in column 
68.1 specifying the type of innovation: product, services, process, orga-
nizational and/or marketing. However, as this survey distinguishes 
between five different types of innovation, in order to capture the 
same information, we proceed to sum the product and the service 
innovation and create a dummy equal to 1 if the company innovate in 
product and/or in service, equal to 0 otherwise. 
Since the objective of the paper is to analyze if the presence of unions 
favors or deter innovation and the effect in innovation is no immedia-
te (Rouvinen, 2002), our dependent variables were measured in 2012 
while our main independent variables were measured in 2009. Howe-
ver, because firms’ current innovation (2012) could also be strongly 
affected by previous innovation activities (2009), since it establishes 
the propensity to innovate of a company (Geldes et al., 2016), we con-
trol for the existence of innovation practices in which companies have 
engaged in the previous period.
3.2.2. Independent variables
To measure the presence and strength of unions, we selected ques-
tion number 92: How many unions exist in your company? and 
question 92.1: What was the percentage of affiliation? from the 
2009 Survey. Based on the answers, the following variables were 
constructed:
4 In particular, we used the ELE and ELE2 available at https://www.economia.gob.cl/category/estudios-encuestas/encuestas-y-bases-de-datos/encuesta-longitudinal-de-empresas-ele
5 The conversion from UF to chilean pesos was done taken into account the UF value of march 2007 (18.383,35 chilean pesos) and the UF value of march 2009 (21.067,76 
chilean pesos). After that, we used the exchange rate chilean peso - dollar of 8th october 2019.
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1. Union_Existence: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is at 
least one union in the company, zero otherwise.
2. Union density: Percentage of unionization in each company (from 
0 to 100).
3. Union density levels: Dummy variable that distinguishes among 
the following different levels of union density.  In order to analyze if 
the effect of unions is linear or not in innovation, we construct the 
same measure as Walsworth (2010), where Union Density None is 
our base category. Explicitly, we distinguish between the following 
levels of union density:
• Union Density None: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the per-
centage of unionization is equal to zero, 0 otherwise.
• Union Density low: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
percentage of unionization is >0 % and  20%, equal to 0 
otherwise.
• Union Density moderately low: Dummy variable equal to 
1 if the percentage of unionization is  >20 and 40%, equal 
to 0 otherwise.
• Union density medium: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
percentage of unionization is  >40% and 60%, equal to 0 
otherwise.
• Union density high: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the per-
centage of unionization is > 60%, equal to 0 otherwise.
3.3.3. Control Variables
Previous innovations: To control from previous innovation activities, 
we used the innovation dummies in the year 2009. These dummies 
are defined equal to 1 if the company has introduced this type of in-
novation, 0 if not. Since the propensity to innovate has been proved 
to be affect positively to the innovative performance (Geldes et al., 
2017), we expect the introduction of innovative practices in the pre-
vious period to have a positive effect on the actual period. 
Size: We control for company size using the logarithm of the num-
ber of employees per company. Based on Avermaete et al. (2003) and 
Maffini Gomes et al., (2009) we expect the company size to influence 
innovation. 
Age: company age is measured as the difference between the year in 
which the company was founded and 2009.  Based on Avermaete et 
al. (2003) we expect company age to present an effect on innovation.
Research and Development: Dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
invested in this period in research and development, and equal to 
zero otherwise. Following Geldes et al., (2017), we expect this variable 
to have a positive effect on innovation.
Subcontracting: Dummy variable equal to one if the company sub-
contracted at least any service in the period, equal to zero otherwise. 
Based on Beladi. and Mukherjee (2017), we expect this variable to 
have an effect on innovation. 
CEO education: dummy variable equal to one if the CEO possess uni-
versity education, zero otherwise. Based on Mo-Ahn et al. (2017), we 
expect CEO education to influence positively on the engagement of 
innovation practices. 
Sector dummies: we add ten dummy sector variables to control for 
the fact that certain sectors are more prone to have high rates of in-
novation than others. The different dummies correspond to the fo-
llowing sectors: Mining, Manufacturing, Energy, Construction, Com-
merce, Hotels / Restaurants, Transportation, Real Estate, Finance, and 
Others. As the base category, we used the mining sector.  Following 
Cefis and Orsenigo (2001), we expect that innovation to be affected 
by the different economic sectors.
3.3. Methodology
Since our objective is to evaluate the effect of the existence of unions 
and union density on the different types of innovation and they are 
binary variables, we use the following logit model:
Where:
• Innovation*12 =
Innov.in production,organization,marketing,and process in 2012.
• IVunion= union_existence, union density and union density 
levels (union_low, union_moderately, union_medium and 
union_high).
• Innovation*09 = 
• Innov.in production,organization,marketing and process in 
2009.
• Sector = Sector dummies.
4. Descriptive Statistics and Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in 
the regression. Regarding innovation variables, we can observe signifi-
cant differences between the percentage of companies that perform diffe-
rent innovations and a growing trend in each one. Regarding the union 
variables, we can observe that just 15.3% of the companies have a union. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Dichotomous Variables – Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N YES NO min max
Process Innov.12 1,539 70% 30% 0 1
Product Innov.12 1,583 41.3% 58.7% 0 1
Organiz. Innov.12 1,570 23.9% 76.1% 0 1
Marketing Innov.12 1,568 21.6% 78.4% 0 1
Process Innov.09 2,667 26.7% 73.3% 0 1
Product Innov.09 2,667 22.8% 77.2% 0 1
Organiz. Innov.09 2,667 21.9% 78.1% 0 1
Marketing Innov.09 2,667 14.1% 85.9% 0 1
Union Variables
Union Existence 2,667 15.3% 84.7% 0 1
Union density_none 2,667 84.7% 15.3% 0 1 
Union density_low 2,667 2.81% 97.2% 0 1
Union density_modlow 2,667 3.15% 96.8% 0 1
Union density_medium 2,667 3.67% 96.3% 0 1
Union density_high 2,667 5.55% 94.5% 0 1
Firms Characteristics
R&D 2,667 49.9% 50.1% 0 1
Subcontracting 2,667 18.8% 81.2% 0 1
CEO education 2,667 61,1% 38,9% 0 1
Quantitative Variables – Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N mean Std. min max
Size 2,667 212.1 841.56 0 18,357
Union density 2,667 7.605 20.908 0 100
Age 2,667 15.29 15.046 0 154
Table  2  shows the  percentage of unions and union den-
sity distinguishing among the different sec tors  in  the 
sample. In this  table, we can perceive many differences among 
sectors.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Sector
Sector Dummies - Statistics
Variables # Firms Union Existence (%) Unionization 
Agriculture 158 9.50% 3.31%
Mining 130 20% 12.89%
Manufacture 357 29.13% 16.32%
Energy 78 48.72% 31.26%
Construction 261 7.66% 3.49%
Commerce 613 8.32% 3.55%
Hotels/Restaurants 270 7.78% 2.80%
Transportation 271 16.97% 8.93%
Real Estate 284 11.27% 4.35%
Finance 100 20% 7.11%
Others 145 23.35% 11.09%
Total 2,667 Mean= 18.43% Mean=7.60%
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Table 3 shows the percentage of companies that introduce the diffe-
rent types of innovations when they have unions vs. if they do not have 
them. As we can observe, for all the cases, the percentage of companies 
that introduce innovations is always 10% higher when there are unions. 
Also, from this table, we can observe that, independently of the presen-
ce of unions, the percentage of companies that introduce the different 
innovation is increasing from the year 2009 to 2012 (except for the case 
of organizational innovation when there are unions).
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by the existence of Unions vs the non-existence.
Union existence and Innovations
Variables % Innovation if Union_existence = 1 % Innovation if Union_existence = 0
Product Innov.12 49.25% 39.20%
Process Innov.12 77.64% 67.72%
Organiz. Innov.12 33.83% 21.20%
Marketing Innov.12 27.11% 20.06%
Product Innov.09 34.64% 20.66%
Process Innov.09 51.60 % 22.26%
Organiz. Innov.09 39.80% 18.67%
Marketing Innov.09 25.80% 11.95%
In Table 4, we observe the Pearson correlation among the variables 
of the study. As we can see, there are several variables with a positive 
and significant correlation. However, the ones that present a higher 
correlation (as is the case between the correlation between Union 
Existence and Union density: 0.857 or between Union density and 
Union density High: 0.83%) are not together in the regression becau-
se they are alternative IV. We do not think the other ones can imply a 
problem for the analysis.
Table 4: Matrix of Pearson Correlations
Matrix of Correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(1) Process Innov.12 1.000
(2) Product Innov.12 0.206* 1.000
(3) Organiz Innov.12 0.110* 0.293* 1.000
(4) Market Innov.12 0.023 0.298* 0.405* 1.000
(5) Product Innov.09 0.046 0.187* 0.166* 0.171* 1.000
(6) Process Innov.09 0.093* 0.142* 0.114* 0.065 0.415* 1.000
(7) Organiz Innov.09 0.051 0.119* 0.119* 0.053 0.361* 0.577* 1.000
(8) Market Innov.09 0.031 0.142* 0.185* 0.160* 0.444* 0.397* 0.469* 1.000
(9) Union_existence 0.089* 0.083* 0.121* 0.070* 0.120* 0.238* 0.184* 0.143* 1.000
(10) Union density 0.070* 0.084* 0.110* 0.051 0.098* 0.211* 0.167* 0.116* 0.857* 1.000
(11) UDensity_none -0.089* -0.083* -0.121* -0.070* -0.120* -0.238* -0.184* -0.143* -1.000 -0.857* 1.000
(12) UDensity_low 0.054 0.016 0.032 -0.001 0.024 0.101* 0.050* 0.045 0.395* 0.012 -0.395* 1.000
(13) UDensity_molow 0.030 0.014 -0.007 0.048 0.066* 0.071* 0.050 0.063* 0.425* 0.212* -0.425* -0.030 1.000
(14) UDensity_med 0.023 0.055 0.133* 0.073* 0.079* 0.112* 0.123* 0.093* 0.460* 0.414* -0.460* -0.033 -0.035 1.000
(15) UDensity_high 0.051 0.058 0.053 0.003 0.052* 0.153* 0.105* 0.057* 0.571* 0.831* -0.571* -0.041 -0.044 -0.047 1.000
(16) Size 0.117* 0.109* 0.190* 0.105* 0.216* 0.368* 0.313* 0.229* 0.551* 0.468* -0.551* 0.215* 0.238* 0.235* 0.318* 1.000
(17) Age 0.067* 0.100* 0.127* 0.048 0.089* 0.123* 0.087* 0.111* 0.252* 0.228* -0.252* 0.065* 0.099* 0.148* 0.143* 0.242* 1.000
(18) R&D -0.121* -0.075* -0.101* -0.001 -0.103* -0.202* -0.152* -0.124* -0.238* -0.200* 0.238* -0.112* -0.103* -0.083* -0.144* -0.387* -0.114* 1.000
(19) Subcontracting 0.066* 0.084* 0.109* 0.076* 0.125* 0.281* 0.216* 0.147* 0.350* 0.292* -0.350* 0.101* 0.182* 0.176* 0.181* 0.468* 0.160* -0.243* 1.000
(20) CEO edu 0.010 0.106* 0.104* 0.068* 0.140* 0.231* 0.195* 0.114* 0.233* 0.221* -0.233* 0.049 0.100* 0.123* 0.153* 0.413* 0.084* -0.184* 0.281* 1.000
* shows significance at the .01 level 
4.2. Results
Our estimates of the determinants of innovation are presented in Ta-
ble 5 (union existence as the independent variable), Table 6 (union 
density as the independent variable) and Table 7 (union density le-
vels as independent variables). In each table, we can observe the re-
gressions of the four types of innovations, where model 1 present the 
regression with the control variables and model 2 adds to the existing 
regression of the independent variable. In Table 5, the coefficient of 
union existence is negative and no significant for every type of inno-
vation. In Table 6, the coefficient of union density is negative for the 
product, marketing, and process innovation but not significant. The 
coefficient of organizational innovation is positive but also no signi-
ficant. Therefore, neither the results of table 5 nor the ones in table 6 
support any of our hypotheses.
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Table 5. Logit - Union Existence
Product Innovation Organization Innovation Marketing Innovation Process Innovation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Union Existence -0.131 -0.117 -0.0435 -0.0549
(0.171) (0.183) (0.193) (0.188)
Product Innov.09 0.408*** 0.406*** 0.353** 0.350** 0.461*** 0.461*** 0.0666 0.0651
(0.137) (0.137) (0.157) (0.157) (0.163) (0.163) (0.153) (0.153)
Process Innov.09 0.200 0.201 -0.0531 -0.0511 -0.100 -0.100 0.307* 0.308*
(0.144) (0.144) (0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174) (0.160) (0.160)
Market. Innov.09 0.182 0.180 0.461** 0.457** 0.550*** 0.548*** -0.0788 -0.0799
(0.166) (0.165) (0.182) (0.181) (0.184) (0.184) (0.180) (0.180)
Organiz. Innov.09 0.106 0.104 0.0505 0.0487 -0.163 -0.164 -0.0312 -0.0320
(0.158) (0.158) (0.188) (0.188) (0.193) (0.193) (0.168) (0.168)
Size 0.0171 0.0310 0.167*** 0.181*** 0.108** 0.113** 0.101** 0.107**
(0.0355) (0.0396) (0.0397) (0.0455) (0.0425) (0.0482) (0.0398) (0.0436)
Age 0.00371 0.00400 0.00397 0.00422 -0.00437 -0.00427 0.00232 0.00244
(0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00388) (0.00389) (0.00439) (0.00440) (0.00407) (0.00408)
R&D -0.0995 -0.0989 -0.107 -0.106 0.245* 0.246* -0.341*** -0.341***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.142) (0.142) (0.147) (0.147) (0.126) (0.126)
Subcontracting 0.147 0.161 0.126 0.136 0.367** 0.372** 0.0208 0.0264
(0.143) (0.144) (0.155) (0.157) (0.166) (0.167) (0.157) (0.159)
CEO_edu 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.264 0.265 0.268 0.268 -0.255* -0.255*
(0.135) (0.135) (0.163) (0.163) (0.165) (0.165) (0.145) (0.145)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES -0.440
Constant -1.169*** -1.190*** -2.697*** -2.719*** -2.652*** -2.661*** 1.223*** 1.216***
(0.304) (0.306) (0.404) (0.407) (0.429) (0.432) (0.356) (0.357)
Observations 1,489 1,489 1,481 1,481 1,476 1,476 1,448 1,448
Pseudo R-squared 0.0677 0.0680 0.0869 0.0871 0.0916 0.0917 0.0373 0.0374
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Table 6. Logit – Union Density
Product Innovation Organization Innovation Marketing Innovation Process Innovation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Union Density -0.000126 0.000157 -0.000382 -0.00227
(0.00278) (0.00292) (0.00313) (0.00309)
Product Innov.09 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.353** 0.353** 0.461*** 0.461*** 0.0666 0.0641
(0.137) (0.137) (0.157) (0.157) (0.163) (0.163) (0.153) (0.153)
Process Innov.09 0.200 0.200 -0.0531 -0.0533 -0.100 -0.100 0.307* 0.306*
(0.144) (0.144) (0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174) (0.160) (0.160)
Market. Innov. 09 0.182 0.182 0.461** 0.462** 0.550*** 0.549*** -0.0788 -0.0829
(0.166) (0.166) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.180) (0.180)
Organiz. Innov.09 0.106 0.106 0.0505 0.0504 -0.163 -0.163 -0.0312 -0.0293
(0.158) (0.158) (0.188) (0.188) (0.193) (0.193) (0.168) (0.168)
Size 0.0171 0.0177 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.108** 0.110** 0.101** 0.112***
(0.0355) (0.0380) (0.0397) (0.0433) (0.0425) (0.0456) (0.0398) (0.0425)
Age 0.00371 0.00373 0.00397 0.00395 -0.00437 -0.00431 0.00232 0.00260
(0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00388) (0.00389) (0.00439) (0.00438) (0.00407) (0.00406)
R&D -0.0995 -0.0994 -0.107 -0.107 0.245* 0.246* -0.341*** -0.341***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.142) (0.142) (0.147) (0.147) (0.126) (0.126)
Subcontracting 0.147 0.148 0.126 0.125 0.367** 0.368** 0.0208 0.0284
(0.143) (0.143) (0.155) (0.156) (0.166) (0.166) (0.157) (0.157)
CEO_edu 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.264 0.263 0.268 0.269 -0.255* -0.252*
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES -0.454
(0.349) (0.349) (0.487) (0.487) (0.479) (0.479) (0.405) (0.404)
Constant -1.169*** -1.170*** -2.697*** -2.697*** -2.652*** -2.654*** 1.223*** 1.218***
(0.304) (0.304) (0.404) (0.405) (0.429) (0.430) (0.356) (0.356)
Observations 1,489 1,489 1,481 1,481 1,476 1,476 1,448 1,448
Pseudo R-squared 0.0677 0.0677 0.0869 0.0869 0.0916 0.0916 0.0373 0.0376
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Table 7. Logit - Union Density Level
Product Innovation Organization Innovation Marketing Innovation Process Innovation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
UDensity_low -0.0128 -0.242 -0.663* 0.229
(0.320) (0.322) (0.389) (0.379)
UDensity_modlow -0.387 -0.904*** 0.00179 -0.192
(0.279) (0.324) (0.307) (0.311)
UDensity_medium -0.0355 0.524* 0.209 -0.265
(0.272) (0.275) (0.288) (0.301)
UDensity_high -0.00393 -0.180 -0.285 -0.144
(0.238) (0.259) (0.283) (0.269)
Product Innov.09 0.408*** 0.413*** 0.353** 0.369** 0.461*** 0.453*** 0.0666 0.0692
(0.137) (0.137) (0.157) (0.157) (0.163) (0.163) (0.153) (0.153)
Process Innov.09 0.200 0.191 -0.0531 -0.0566 -0.100 -0.0797 0.307* 0.297*
(0.144) (0.145) (0.172) (0.171) (0.174) (0.174) (0.160) (0.160)
Market. Innov.09 0.182 0.181 0.461** 0.476*** 0.550*** 0.555*** -0.0788 -0.0868
(0.166) (0.166) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.180) (0.180)
Organiz. Innov.09 0.106 0.101 0.0505 0.0176 -0.163 -0.182 -0.0312 -0.0245
(0.158) (0.159) (0.188) (0.187) (0.193) (0.192) (0.168) (0.168)
Size 0.0171 0.0271 0.167*** 0.191*** 0.108** 0.127*** 0.101** 0.112***
(0.0355) (0.0392) (0.0397) (0.0458) (0.0425) (0.0484) (0.0398) (0.0432)
Age 0.00371 0.00388 0.00397 0.00384 -0.00437 -0.00445 0.00232 0.00271
(0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00388) (0.00412) (0.00439) (0.00445) (0.00407) (0.00405)
R&D -0.0995 -0.0988 -0.107 -0.111 0.245* 0.237 -0.341*** -0.337***
(0.121) (0.120) (0.142) (0.142) (0.147) (0.147) (0.126) (0.127)
Subcontracting 0.147 0.171 0.126 0.146 0.367** 0.363** 0.0208 0.0427
(0.143) (0.144) (0.155) (0.157) (0.166) (0.168) (0.157) (0.159)
CEO edu 0.352*** 0.350*** 0.264 0.254 0.268 0.267 -0.255* -0.249*
(0.135) (0.136) (0.163) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.145) (0.145)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES (0.353)
Constant -1.169*** -1.199*** -2.697*** -2.794*** -2.652*** -2.676*** 1.223*** -0.639
(0.304) (0.305) (0.404) (0.425) (0.429) (0.438) (0.356) (0.444)
-0.865**
Observations 1,489 1,489 1,481 1,481 1,476 1,476 1,448 (0.361)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0387 0.0687 0.0387 0.0960 0.0387 0.0948 0.0387 -0.827**
(0.337)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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However, table 7 shows more precise results. In this table, union den-
sity is segmented into five groups. The dummy variable identifying 
companies with null union density acts as the reference group for the 
remaining four union density level variables. As is observed, for the 
product, and process innovation the coefficients for every union den-
sity level are no significant. However, for organizational innovation, 
the coefficient for union density moderately low is negative and signi-
ficant at the 0.01 level while the coefficient for union density medium 
is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. In other words, compared to 
companies with no union presence, a moderately low level of union 
density (> 20% -  40%) restricts a company’s capacity to innovate in 
organizational aspects, whereas the medium level of union density 
(> 40% - 60%)) promote this type of innovation. The coefficients for 
the other two extreme union density levels (low and high union den-
sity) are not statistically significant for this type of innovation. For 
marketing innovation, a significant negative effect at the 0.01 level 
is observed for companies with low union density (20). Meanwhile, 
companies with higher levels of union density do not show significant 
results. All these results are supported using the Probit model6
5. Conclusion and Discussion
The primary objective of this paper was to analyze the effect of unions 
on innovation in the Chilean context.  Our results do not support 
completely any of the two competing hypotheses, instead they suggest 
both are acceptable because the direction and significance of union 
effect depend on the type of innovation and the union density level. 
Two interesting questions arise from these findings and demand fur-
ther research in the field. First, why is the union’ effect significant on 
the organizational and marketing innovations and is not on the pro-
duct and the process innovations? The particularities of the Chilean 
context could help to understand this puzzle. As it was mentioned 
in the background section, the legislation radically limits the scope 
of negotiation. In practice, collective bargaining is restrained from 
wasting adjustment, working time, workers’ benefits and other su-
perficial aspects of the labor process (Dirección del Trabajo, 2016a). 
Moreover, chilean union leaders rarely count with basic business or 
management training, therefore they have difficulties to negotiate in 
equal conditions with managers complicate aspects of production. In 
consequence, any union intervention in favor or against innovation 
will probably refer to organizational aspects.
On the other hand, the adverse effect of unions on marketing inno-
vation may be explained by the unions’ effect on wages. In general 
terms, companies that feel threatened and that face any level of un-
certainty, tend to reduce investments in intangible assets, such as 
marketing, because their effects are not immediate and a priori do 
not affect the company production (Stein, 2005). In the same line, it 
could be that Chilean companies may be motivated to cut off or re-
duce the investment in marketing innovation when they fear unions 
can eventually expropriate the fruit of this investment. No doubt, it is 
easier and less costly for companies to intervene in this area to com-
pensate unions’ effect on wage compared with reducing the process or 
product innovation that can put at risk their competitive advantage. 
Further research should explain why this effect became statistically 
insignificant for companies with more than 20% of union density. 
The second question refers to the differences that were found between 
the coefficients of the four union density levels. On the one hand, 
the effect of union on organizational innovation was not significant 
in companies with the lowest union density. This may be explained 
because unions in these cases are too weak to force management to 
modify its practices, either to stop an innovation plan or to promote 
one. The effect on organizational innovation would become visible 
when unions count with the support of a more relevant part of the 
employees and thus when they can challenge management. On the 
other hand, the effect on the organizational innovation revealed to 
be negative when union density is between 20% and 40%, positive 
when is between 40% and 60%, and negative but not significant when 
is higher than 60%. This suggests that organizational innovation does 
not respond linearly to union strength. For instance, powerful midd-
le unions may be more motivated to collaborate with management 
in the implementation of an innovation plan than moderately low 
powerful unions because the first have probably satisfied more basic 
needs and have more chances to turn this plan in favor of workers. 
Instead, strongest unions could be interested in pursuing more ra-
dical changes at the workplace that are not necessarily favorable to 
management’s innovation’s plans because they have the resources to 
do so. In other words, whether unions and management collaborate 
for fostering innovation depend on multiple factors, union density 
could be just one of them. Further research is needed to identify the 
other factors at stake. A key aspect to consider in this research should 
be the power of unions in different economic branches. Regardless of 
the union density, chilean unions in economic branches such mining, 
that are strategic for the country, have more chances to force manage-
ment to negotiate and, thus, to affect innovation.
Finally, we consider essential to point out the implication of our fin-
dings to the GII. Although their role in innovative activities depends on 
multiple factors, unions are an important element of the national eco-
nomy in countries with high union density or where unions play a poli-
tical role. This is the case of many Latin America nations. Our findings 
confirm that, under certain conditions, unions can generate inefficien-
cy inside the organization and divert companies from innovating, but 
they can also be a key ally for management to promote such initiatives. 
In this sense, in our opinion, the GII should consider this aspect in its 
analysis. We are not suggesting that the GII should encourage coun-
tries to promote unions for increasing firms’ competitiveness, but that 
it should consider the existence of these organizations as a relevant 
parameter in the design and implementation of innovation policies. 
6 For further information regarding the tables, please contact the corresponding author.
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This paper presents two main limitations: First, our sample is not re-
presentative; therefore, our results cannot be generalized to the whole 
population. Second, our study considers just two periods, limiting the 
use of econometric models that can capture better the specificities of 
the data. Further research should be focused on capturing better and 
more detailed data to complement the presented results.
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